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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine whether greater inter-state trade, democracy and reduced military 
spending lower belligerence between India and Pakistan. We begin with theoretical 
models covering the opportunity costs of conflict in terms of trade losses and security 
spending, as well as the costs of making concessions to rivals. Conflict between the 
two nations can be best understood in a multivariate framework where variables such 
as economic performance, integration with rest of the world, bilateral trade, military 
expenditure, democracy scores and population are simultaneously considered. Our 
empirical investigation based on time series econometrics from 1950-2005 suggests 
that reduced bilateral trade, greater military expenditure, less development 
expenditure, lower levels of democracy, lower growth rates and less general trade 
openness are all conflict enhancing. Globalization, or a greater openness to 
international trade with the rest of the world, is the most significant driver of a liberal 
peace, rather than a common democratic orientation suggested by the pure form of 
the democratic peace.  
 
J.E.L Codes: F15, F51, F52. 
 
Keywords: Inter-state conflict and trade, democracy and conflict, conflict and 
economic development. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines inter-state hostility between India and Pakistan, which 
is arguably one of the most prominent inter-state conflicts still extant, and 
whose saliency is magnified by the presence of nuclear weapons. Conflict 
reduction is also necessary in the region to release resources for poverty 
reduction. We analyse some of the factors that might lead to conflict 
abatement between these long standing rivals, especially the role of 
increased international trade as a conflict mitigating factor.  
 
Outright war is just one manifestation of the rivalry between nations; the 
armed peace is equally consistent with aggressiveness. India and Pakistan 
have had four large scale military confrontations (1948, 1965, 1971 and 
1999), but otherwise spend a great deal of time in uncompromising posturing 
vis-à-vis each other. Central to their hostility is the territorial dispute over 
Kashmir. India, in particular, frequently accuses Pakistan of sponsoring 
terrorism in her territory. Negotiations are infrequent, but occasionally both 
nations make goodwill gestures, such as sending out peace buses between 
cities, and agree to cricket tours. Figure 1 (based on the data in Faten, 
Palmer and Bremer, 2004) charts the hostility levels of the two states on a 
scale of 0-6. It has never been below 2, but is usually at a high level of 4, 
which indicates belligerency short of outright war.  
  
Figure 1: Hostility Levels between India and Pakistan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International trade allows one country to peacefully benefit from the 
endowment of another nation through voluntary exchange. Conflict and 
rivalry are symptomatic of the absence of cooperation, including lesser 
bilateral trade. Equally, conflict may be said to be a consequence of the lack 
of trade. Polachek (1997) and Polachek and Seiglie (2006) argue that wars 
and disputes between geographically contiguous states involve substantial 
losses, as more efficient geographically proximate trade is displaced.  Figure 
2 shows that India-Pakistan official trade (as a proportion of Pakistan’s total 
international trade) steadily declined from nearly 20% in the early 1950s, 
plummeting to almost zero after their war in 1965, and has shown some 
signs of recovery in the 1990s. But it is still below the levels of the 1950s, 
which was shortly after the two nations were separated politically. This is 
despite the fact that both India and Pakistan have fairly open economies at 
present.  
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Figure 2: Patterns in India-Pakistan Trade  
 
 
A related issue concerns the so-called democratic peace1, see Polachek 
(1997) and Polachek and Seiglie (2006) for a review of this substantial 
literature. The idea is that democracies will not fight each other because they 
share cultural norms that militate against forceful dispute resolution, or 
alternatively the checks and balances that characterise political processes in 
advanced democracies restrain violence. Put simply, the idea is that 
established democracies do not go to war with each other, but cooperate 
instead. The intellectual basis for this argument has been traced back to 
Immanuel Kant’s (1795) work on the Perpetual Peace, where a like 
mindedness referred to as cosmopolitanism would prevent outright war 
between republics; a tendency that could be reinforced by commercial 
interdependence. Mirroring Kant’s thoughts, is the contemporary 
philosopher, John Rawl’s (1999) notion of peace between liberal societies or 
nations, arguing that liberal societies do not go to war with each other 
because their needs are satisfied, they are non-acquisitive in the sense of 
not wishing to grow beyond an achieved steady-state level of (presumably 
high) income, and they are tolerant of difference. They will only fight in self-
defence, and invade to prevent gross human rights abuses such as 
genocide in other countries. Polachek (1997) makes a case for the 
alternative notion of the liberal peace2, presenting empirical evidence to 
suggest that advanced democracies cooperate, not because of their similar 
political systems, but due to their vast and multiply intersecting economic 
interdependence. Oneal and Russett (1999) also show that trade and peace 
are highly correlated. Barbieri (1996) demonstrates that the liberal peace 
based upon the pacific effects of economic interdependence may be a 
chimera. Hegre (2000), however, argues that economic interdependence 
reinforces peace, between more developed economies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
1
 Sometimes the literature refers to this concept also as the liberal peace, which is a source of 
some confusion as some authors refer to the peace emanating from economic 
interdependence also as the liberal peace.  
2
 Theories of the liberal peace may be traced back to the Baron de Montesquieu’s, Spirit of 
the Laws (1748), where he states that commerce tends to promote peace between nations; 
mutual self-interest precludes war; trade also softens attitudes of peoples towards each other. 
 4 
  Pakistan and India's Education 
Expenditures
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
19
50
19
54
19
58
19
62
19
66
19
70
19
74
19
78
19
82
19
86
19
90
19
94
19
98
20
02
Years
Pedug
Iedug
Pakistan and India's Defence Expenditures
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
19
50
19
54
19
58
19
62
19
66
19
70
19
74
19
78
19
82
19
86
19
90
19
94
19
98
20
02
Year
Pdg
Idg
Figure 3: Conflict, Development and Democracy Trends in India-Pakistan 
 
The Polity score gives us an average score of democracy and autocracy 
ranging from 10 to -10, acting as an indicator of the overall political system. 
India has always had one of the highest democracy scores in the developing 
world (scoring 7-9), whereas Pakistan’s experience with democracy 
fluctuates, with high autocracy scores associated with military coups in 1958, 
1969, 1977 and 1999. Figure 3 indicates that military expenditures tend to 
move inversely with development (education) expenditure, providing prima 
facie evidence that large military expenditure crowds out development. In 
fact, these two countries have among the highest military burdens in the 
world outside the Middle East (World Development Indicators, 2006).  
 
The opportunity costs of conflict could rise when countries move to higher 
stages of economic development as they have more to lose from conflict, 
and have more resources to negotiate peaceful settlements. The 1990s is 
considered to be a golden decade for India as GDP growth rates on average 
the Indian economy grew at 5-6% annually. Pakistan, too, has been growing 
at an average of 6% for the last 3 to 4 years. Despite a relatively high 
democracy score in Pakistan up to 1999, conflict between the countries 
escalated in the 1990s. By contrast, the recent regime in Pakistan which had 
a strong military orientation made major unilateral concessions to India vis-à-
vis their long standing disputes over Kashmir. Could that be related to the 
very recent impressive growth record in Pakistan?  If anything, conflict 
between the two nations can be best understood in a multivariate framework 
where the relevant variables and processes (economic performance, 
integration with rest of the world, bilateral trade, military expenditure, 
democracy and population) are simultaneously taken into account. We 
examine whether greater inter-state trade, democracy and reduced military 
spending lowers belligerence between India and Pakistan in a time series 
framework, between 1950 and 2005 in most cases. The rest of the paper is 
organised as follows: section 2 contains the theoretical model, the empirical 
analysis is presented in section 3, and section 4 concludes.    
 
2 THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
This section consists of two parts: the first deals with the costs of belligerent 
behaviour in a single country context where the losses are displaced trade 
and the crowding out effects of defence expenditure; the second looks at the 
costs of peaceful behaviour where the disutility of making concessions to an 
adversary is modelled in a two country setting. The situations we model 
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either pertain to limited warfare, with negligible effects on national 
endowments, or alternatively we could be said to model the costs of an 
armed peace associated with large security and military establishments. In 
many ways, conflict has similar effects as other forms of trade wars.  
 
A  Costs of War 
 
We begin with a single country’s decision making with regard to 
belligerence, based on Polachek (1997). The welfare of either country (U) 
depends upon consumption (E), and security (S), entering the utility function 
in a separable fashion: 
 
),( SEuU =
         (1)  
Where: 
TMXcQE −+−=
        (2) 
Q is the total endowment of the country where a proportion c is devoted to 
private and public non-military consumption and investment; a fraction 1-c to 
a public good covering security or military expenditure. X and M denote 
exports and imports to the rival country, and T represents trade (exports 
minus imports) with the rest of the world. θ is the price of the exportable and 
the price of the importable is the numeraire good, normalised at unity. There 
is also a balance of trade constraint; the value of exports must equal 
imports: 
0,0)( <=+− sXTMSX Kθ
      (3)  
 
Following Polachek (1997) let us postulate that conflict disrupts trade. 
Specifically, it lowers exports, but unlike in Polachek’s model both countries 
are hostile towards each other, and not just one country (described as the 
actor) against a passive target. So, in our model, both countries exports to 
each other will decline, along with ambiguous effects on the terms of trade. 
The country whose goods are demanded more elastically will experience the 
negative terms of trade effect. Nevertheless, exports displaced by conflict 
are a loss, as they represent foregone trade, especially in the context of 
neighbours who might be expected to trade substantially in peaceful 
circumstances.  Substituting (3) as a constraint and (2) into (1) allows us to 
write a Lagrangian function (L), where λ indicates the Lagrange multiplier: 
 
)(])([);( SCTMSXSTMXcQuL −+−+−+−= θλ
   (4) 
 
The function C represents the distortionary (taxation and crowding out) costs 
of security expenditure, which rises with S, so that the partial derivative is 
positive. This is an additional cost associated with security spending, absent 
in Polachek’s (1997) model. The first order condition with respect to S is: 
 
0,0, <>+−= ssssss XCuCXu Lλ       (5) 
 
In equation (5) the marginal utility of security (us) is equated to its marginal 
costs. The latter (on the right-hand side of (5)) is comprised of the trade 
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disruption due to conflict, and the cost of diverting resources to military and 
security expenditure. This, last effect, is absent from the Polachek models. 
The cost of conflict is not just confined to displaced trade, but it also has a 
distortionary resource cost because of security expenditure, either because 
of distortionary taxation or due to the crowding out effect on other forms of 
investment, including government spending on health and education; see 
Deger and Sen (1990). Note, that security expenditure and benefits derived 
from confronting one’s enemy does yield positive utility, but comes at a 
price. There is, therefore, an additional cost of belligerent behaviour over 
and above losses from trade displacement, and is likely to be substantial 
because it detracts from poverty reduction directly.  
 
B Costs of Peace 
 
If peace is Pareto optimal, why don’t countries favour it?3 In this section we 
model the costs of peace, which include psychic non-pecuniary costs of 
making concessions to one’s adversaries. Additionally, we try to 
demonstrate how increased globalization and democratisation can help to 
reduce conflict by lowering the cost of making concessions to one’s 
neighbours. To analyse these factors we require a two country expected 
utility model of non-cooperative strategic interaction.  
 
The two countries: India and Pakistan are indexed by subscripts I for India 
and P for Pakistan. There are two states of nature, denoted by superscripts: 
one more peaceful or dovish (D), and the other associated with greater 
hawkishness (H). Their probabilities are defined as pi and 1 - pi, respectively. 
The probability of either state is in turn affected by a actions and efforts; (a) 
for India and (e) for Pakistan. These are also the strategic variables employed 
by the two sides to the conflict. We postulate that the probability of the 
peaceful state pi rises with the input of action and effort by the two sides, but 
at diminishing rates. One can imagine a range of activities by one or both 
sides if they wish to promote peace, including a greater willingness to 
compromise, reduce military expenditure, devoting more resources to 
peaceful economic development, or a greater willingness to respond to calls 
for peace by third-parties such as the UN and the United States.  
 
Actions and efforts to seek peace entail costs for each party. The costs of 
actions to promote peace could take a variety of forms, but, above all, there is 
the loss of face to either party’s hawkish domestic political constituencies, 
including the military establishment. Increased globalization may, however, 
augment the stock of rhetoric available to politicians who wish to push their 
‘peace’ agenda through the political process. Secondly, and in a more 
palpable sense, increased international trade and the growth it brings may 
provide the additional resources to buy off domestic ‘war’ lobbies. A more 
democratic government, following military rule, may similarly use its mandate 
from the people to justify greater peace and reduced military expenditure.      
                                                
3
 Sir Normal Angell, winner of the 1933 Nobel peace price and former editor of Foreign 
Affairs, in his great book The Great Illusion, asserted that nations could never enrich 
themselves through war, and even a victorious nation would come off economically worse 
from a war; see Angell-Lane (1910).  
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The expected utility of India is given by 
 
))(()(),)(1()(),( TaZSEUeaSEUeaU HIHIHIDIDIDII −+−++= pipi   (6) 
 
Where I
DU and I
HU denote utilities or pay-offs in dovish and hawkish states 
respectively, weighted by the probabilities of the two states. 
D
I
D
I SE + , 
H
I
H
I SE + indicate the exogenous pair of payoffs from consumption and 
security expenditure respectively in the less belligerent and more belligerent 
states respectively. The difference is that in dovish state security spending is 
lower and private consumption higher than in the hawkish state. There will 
also be more trade between the two countries. Most importantly, the dovish 
state of nature will imply greater poverty reduction. Z is the cost function of 
undertaking the action, a. Action, a, increases the probability of peace,pi, 
however, undertaking it entails a cost, as described above. T indicates greater 
globalization (more trade with the rest of the world), and this is postulated to 
reduce the cost of making peace via the cost function (Z) as discussed above, 
Za1 < 0.4 Also, pia > 0, but piaa < 0; there are diminishing returns to these 
actions. However, both Za > 0 and Zaa > 0.  
 
Turning to Pakistan, we symmetrically have 
 
)),(()(),)(1()(),( PTeLSEUeaSEUeaU HPHPHIDPDPDPP −+−++= pipi  (7) 
 
L is the cost of effort, e, which increases the probability of peace, pi. As with 
India, greater globalization lowers the marginal cost of making peaceful 
concessions, but so does a hybrid concept called increased democratisation 
(P) for Pakistan only given the nature of swings there between democratically 
elected governments and military rule; Le1 and Le2 < 0. Also, pie > 0, but piee < 
0, Le > 0, and Lee > 0.  
 
In the non-cooperative or Cournot-Nash game played by the two sides both 
sides move simultaneously. Each side, therefore, maximises its own utility 
function with respect to its own choice variable. For India, it implies 
maximising utility, Equation (6), with respect to a as shown by 
 [ ] aHIDIa ZUU =⋅−⋅ )()(pi        (8) 
 
Pakistan maximises Equation (7) with respect to e 
 [ ] eHPDPe LUU =⋅−⋅ )()(pi        (9) 
 
                                                
4
 Increased globalization is unlikely to directly affect the marginal productivity of actions or 
efforts (a, e) that raise the probability of peace (pi).  
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Note that in Equations (8) and (9) each side will equate its marginal benefit 
from exercising their own strategic choice to the corresponding marginal cost. 
Each side's strategic choices will depend on the first order conditions given in 
Equations (8) and (9), along with a fixed conjecture about the opposition's 
strategic choice. These lead to the (linear) reaction functions for both sides, 
obtained by totally differentiating Equations (8) and (9) with respect to a and 
e. For India this is indicated by 
 [ ][ ] 00)()( )()(/ ≤≥≤≥⋅−⋅ ⋅−⋅+= aeHIDIae
D
I
H
Iaaaa
I
if
UU
UUZ
Rda
de
pi
pi
pi
LKK
   (10)  
 
and for Pakistan by 
 [ ][ ] 00)()( )()(/ ≤≥≤≥⋅−⋅+ ⋅−⋅= aeDPHPeeee
H
P
D
Pae
P
if
UUL
UU
Rda
de
pi
pi
pi
KKK
   (11) 
 
Note that piae = piea by symmetry.  
   
 
 
S 
e 
a 
Figure 4: Reaction Functions of India and Pakistan 
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The reaction functions are positively sloped if piae > 0, implying that the two 
strategies are complements. This is the standard assumption in the literature 
on conflict. In our model, however, we postulate that piae < 0, the choice 
variables are strategic substitutes, and the reaction functions slope 
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downwards (Figure 4). This can occur because the strategy space is defined 
in terms of peace. Thus, if one side behaves more peacefully it increases the 
utility of both parties and the other side may free ride on this action by not 
bringing about a corresponding increase in their action.  
 
In Figure 4, two non-cooperative equilibria are illustrated by points N and C 
respectively. Point C is more cooperative and peaceful with greater inter-
country trade and poverty reduction. A shift from N to C can occur because of 
greater globalisation (rise in T) because of, say, the establishment of a free 
trade area, and increased international (not necessarily just bilateral) trade 
lowers the marginal cost of peaceful behaviour (Za1, Le1< 0). Analytically this 
means a change in the first-order conditions for both India:  [ ] dTZUU aHIDIa 1)()( =⋅−⋅pi         (8’) 
and, for Pakistan [ ] dTLUU eHPDPe 1)()( =⋅−⋅pi         (9’) 
 
This pertains to the liberal peace. Alternatively, there could be a rise in the 
exogenous pay-offs in terms of consumption expenditure (E) in (8) and (9) 
above, leading to the same outcome in figure 4.  
 
The costs of peaceful actions may be easier to bear when countries (in this 
case only Pakistan) are more democratic, as there may be a mandate from 
the people to engage in more poverty reduction, greater social sector 
spending and lower military expenditure. This corresponds to the democratic 
peace and will cause the first order condition for Pakistan to become:  [ ] dPLUU eHPDPe 2)()( =⋅−⋅pi       (9’’) 
 
This causes Pakistan’s reaction function to shift outwards along India’s, with a 
new equilibrium at point S. Note, however, in the new equilibrium (point S) 
India has effectively passed on some of the burden of adjustment to Pakistan. 
In fact, the level of effort exercised by Pakistan is greater than even in the 
more cooperative solution (C), but not India’s. This could be argued to be the 
case at present. As India moves closer to the United States, and with the 
latter’s global war on terror, more pressure is exerted on Pakistan to make 
unilateral concessions towards India since 2001. We could even argue that 
India is free riding on Pakistan. 
 
 
3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
A Hypotheses 
H1: Greater bilateral inter-state commerce between the two countries, as well 
as greater multilateral trade with third countries lowers various forms of 
bilateral inter-state conflict. This corresponds to the liberal peace. This 
hypothesis follows from our theoretical discussion, specifically the first order 
conditions in (8’) and (9’), and in inversely from the right-hand side of (5).  
H2: More military spending as a result of increased insecurity raises conflict. 
The hegemonic power, however, may have internal conflict (India has many 
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civil wars) and other neighbours to militarily confront. The marginal utility of 
security spending rises in (5), as well as in (8) and (9).  
H3: Development expenditure (such as public spending on education) should 
lower conflict, because of economic growth which enables more consumption 
in equations (4) to (9). This is also related to the increased democratisation 
hypothesis, below.  
H4: GDP growth will decrease inter-state conflict; there is more to lose from 
war. This raises the utility from consumption in (4), (6) through to (9).  
H5: Increases in dyadic democracy scores will lead to less conflict, related to 
the notion of the democratic peace. Increased democracy may lower the cost 
of concessions and compromise with former enemies, as in (9’’) above. 
 
B Empirical Results 
 
There are various data sources on inter-state conflict, see Murshed and 
Mamoon (2007). In this paper we report results using the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Project (UCDP) with the collaboration of the International Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and is collected on an annual basis and 
covers the full post-World War II period, 1946–2003, see Harbom et al (2006). 
Military expenditures can reflect hostility, as well as deterrence (Polachek and 
Seglie, 2006).  In the India-Pakistan case, we would like to examine how each 
country’s military expenditure/ military burden affects the dispute. Pakistan’s 
spending on military expenditure as a proportion of GDP is higher than 
India’s. We also look at the proportion of military personnel to the overall 
population. This might reflect the extent of militarization in a society.  To 
capture democracy levels for India and Pakistan, we turn to the Polity IV 
project hosted by Center of International Development and Conflict 
Management (CIDCM). Polity IV computes a combined polity score by 
subtracting autocracy scores from the democracy scores for the 
corresponding year. The value of this Polity score ranges from -10 to 10, 
where -10 denotes the highest autocracy level, and 10 the maximum 
democracy score. Although India always takes a high positive value of 7 or 
above, Pakistan frequently takes on negative values. We construct a dyadic 
variable of democracy for both countries by combining (multiplying) their Polity 
scores, following Polachek and Seiglie (1969). We add 10 to each countries 
polity series to make the negative Polity values positive so that our combined 
democracy score may capture the variations in the democratization process 
only on a positive scale. The dyadic democracy variable shows values as low 
as 50 on the scale of 0 to 400 when there are high levels of political 
dissimilarities between Pakistan (dictatorship) and India (democracy), and as 
high as 350 when both countries are governed by democracies (see figure 5). 
A full data description is presented in the appendix.  
Figure 5: Dyadic democracy scores for Pakistan and India 
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Any simple least square regression analysis may lead to spurious results due 
to the endogeniety problems among our variables (from trade, military 
expenditure and growth to conflict and vice-versa). We need to utilize a 
simultaneous equation model where potential endogenieties between various 
variables are addressed. In Murshed and Mamoon (2007), based on our time 
series data, we ran a Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) which is an 
extension of univariate autoregressive (AR) models to capture the evolution 
and the interdependencies between our multiple time series (Sims, 1980).  
These results were based on dyadic variables and we found that trade with 
the rest of the world was the most major factor in reducing India-Pakistan 
conflict. In other words, general globalization was most important in lowering 
India-Pakistan tensions, compared to bilateral trade. This is not surprising, as 
these two countries being quite poor are more likely to trade with the rest of 
the world compared to each other. Secondly, a common democratic 
orientation is secondary to globalization in mitigating conflict between the two 
nations (as indicated earlier, this applies mainly to Pakistan, as India is a 
steady democracy whereas Pakistan oscillitates between military rule and 
elected governments). Thus, we found greater support for the liberal 
(economic) peace relative to the democratic peace. Interestingly when we ran 
Granger (1969) causality tests we found reverse causality between conflict 
and bilateral trade, as well as militarization and education expenditure. Thus, 
increased trade not only reduces conflict, but conflict also lowers bilateral 
trade. A similar argument can be applied to militarization and education 
expenditure, as increased threat perceptions also raise military expenditure 
and lower development spending.  
 
In this paper we analyze country specific, rather than dyadic, effects in order 
to investigate in detail the potential of each country’s trade levels, military 
burden, development expenditure and economic performance in enhancing 
peace and mitigating conflict. For Pakistan, we use Pakistan’s trade share 
with rest of the world (Popen), Pakistan’s total exports to GDP ratio (Pexpg) 
and Pakistan’s imports to GDP ratio (Pimpg) as proxies for Pakistan’s 
multilateral trade. Pakistan’s exports to India (Pxi) are a proxy for bilateral 
trade. Pakistan’s defence expenditure as a percentage of its GDP (Pdg) is a 
proxy for the military burden, and Pedug is Pakistan’s education expenditure 
as a percentage of its GDP.  Similarly for India, we employ 3 proxies of 
multilateral trade namely Iopen, Iexpg and Iimpg, 1 proxy for bilateral trade 
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(Ixp), 1 proxy for military burden (Idg) and 1 proxy for education expenditure 
(Iedug). We do not use separate Polity scores for India and Pakistan, as any 
changes in combined democracy scores are due to Pakistan. Before we carry 
out our econometric analysis, we undertook the stationary test. Note that our 
independent variables are time series in nature, and thus may have 
autocorrelation. Achieving stationarity in such series may be difficult.  
 
We ran unit root tests on the above variables and find that the unit root is only 
solved at first differences, as shown by table 1. Since at levels, nearly all 
variables have unit roots, there should be at least one co-integrating 
relationship for our analysis to move forward. In other words, we cannot use 
unrestricted VAR analysis but need to undertake Vector Error Correction 
Methodology (VECM) which is only a restricted VAR, where we first find the 
presence of the number of co-integration equations in each VECM 
specification and then run the regression analysis. VECM also allows us to 
have a rich set of information among variables including their short and long-
term adjustment dynamics and thus provides a more comprehensive insight 
into the relationship among variables compared to an unrestricted VAR.  
 
Table 1 
 Augmented Dickey Fuller Test 
Variables  Lag length With intercept With intercept and trend 
    
∆ Fatal 1 -0.875* -0.929* 
∆ Popen 1 -0.977* -0.984* 
∆ Iopen 1 -1.192* -1.495* 
∆ Pexpg 1 -0.937* -0.965* 
∆  Iexpg 1 -0.940* -1.257* 
∆ Pimpg 1 -1.125* -1.121* 
∆ Iimpg 1 -1.321* -1.449 
∆ Pxi 1 -1.692* -1.702* 
∆ Ixp 1 -1.971* -2.328* 
∆ Pedu 1 -0.946 -1.025* 
∆ Iedu 1 -0.841* -0.879* 
∆ Pgpc 1 -1.992* -1.995* 
∆ Igpc 1 -2.292* -2.293* 
∆ Pdg 1 -1.421* -1.441* 
∆ Idg 1 -0.899* -0.877* 
∆ Pmilpop 1 -1.289* -1.292* 
∆ Imilpop 1 -0.756* -0.766* 
∆ Demopi 1 -0.982* -0.982* 
-*, ** and *** shows significance at 1%, 5%and 10% level 
 
The three reduced form VECM equations for Conflict are as follows: 
t
y
ityatitititititititititititt CDemoIdgPdgItrPtrConfConf 1
6
1
,,6,5,4,3,2,111 )( Ε+++++++= ∑
=
−−−−−−−−−−−−
ββββββα
……………….(12) 
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……………..(14) 
Here, s'β show the co-integration relationship for each variable under 
investigation for each equation, and the s'α show the adjustment parameters. 
sC' are the constant terms for each six variables on the right hand side of each 
VECM equation, and the s'Ε are the respective error terms. As mentioned, the 
general openness indicator, total export shares, total import shares and 
exports to the other country of conflict for both India and Pakistan are utilized 
as 4 separate single country proxies of trade.  Thus there are 4 separate 
specifications for equation (12). Equation (13) employs education and 
Equation (14) employs per capita growth rates to capture development 
expenditure and level of economic development for India and Pakistan 
respectively while defense and democracy proxies are common regressors for 
all specifications.  Fatal, which is our dependent variable, captures severity of 
conflict. The total number of VECM specifications rise to 6.  
The results for the VECM equations are presented in table 2. The lag length 
for each VEC equation is (1), based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) 
and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC). There is one co-
integrating equation in each VECM, confirming the robustness of the model 
specification. Note, that optimal value of conflict is zero in the long run, 
meaning that our conflict measure, Fatal takes the value of 0.  
The results for VECM 1 show that Fatal takes a negative value, and Popen 
and Iopen positive values. This means that in the short-term both Pakistan 
and Indian trade shares are negatively related with Fatal. However, only 
Indian trade is significant enough to exert a negative pressure on hostilities in 
the short-term adjustment period. In the long run both Pakistan’s and Indian 
trade shares with rest of the world will adjust by moving in opposite directions. 
In the long run Pakistan would witness a rise in its trade with the outside world 
and Indian trade would decline to its steady-state level. The long-term net 
result on the trade share of both countries is expected to be positive as trade 
would be at higher levels with peace. The long-term rise in Pakistan’s trade 
shares in order to adjust to a fall in hostility levels also mean that the negative 
effects of India-Pakistan conflict have thwarted Pakistan’s capacity to trade in 
international markets more than in India’ case. Results on VECM 2 suggest 
that in short-term both exports by India and Pakistan would rise to adjust to 
any fall in conflict. However, in the long run Pakistani exports would remain 
unchanged, whereas Indian exports will adjust downwards. Similar short-term 
adjustment dynamics for imports are observed for India in VECM 3. However 
in the long run Pakistan’s imports would rise as conflict moves to its minimally 
optimal value of 0, whereas imports by India will adjust downwards. The 
 14 
above discussion suggest that Pakistan’s trading capability has been 
seriously hampered by the conflict between both nations despite the fact 
Pakistan has been historically the more open economy when compared to 
India. As far as Indian trade with the outside world is concerned, in the short-
term it is destined to rise further especially if hostilities with Pakistan abate. 
However, the long run trade share would adjust downwards unless India 
follows a more open trade policy and further reduce its tariffs to levels similar 
to Pakistan. 
Bilateral trade would also respond to increased peace as shown by the results 
of VECM 4. In the short-term there is a sign of increase in bilateral trade 
between India and Pakistan, but the increase is not significant meaning trade 
between India and Pakistan would remain low. However, in the long run 
Indian exports to Pakistan would decline to reach a steady-state level. Some 
in Pakistan fear that peace initiatives like reducing tariffs for Indian goods 
would mean greater dependency on Indian produce. Taking into account the 
historically high hostility levels between two countries, any peace initiative or 
confidence building measure which leads to greater market access for India is 
viewed with scepticism in Pakistan, as many fear that dependence on India 
may expose Pakistan to unnecessary pressures from India, leaving her 
vulnerable to one sided solutions to the Kashmir dispute. Our results show 
that in the long run the dependency on Indian cheap goods would actually 
decline, and both countries would end up being equal trading partners. Thus 
more bilateral trade, far from creating any power imbalance between India 
and Pakistan, would equally distribute the gains. Pakistan may fulfil its import 
needs more from other developing countries such as China.  The results for 
VECM 5 suggest that education expenditure would increase in the short-term 
to reduce conflict, and as conflict falls to its optimal level, Pakistan would be 
able to simultaneously devote greater resources to its education sector. High 
growth rates also adjust positively to decrease hostility levels and in the long 
run as the hostilities fall, both countries also witness a strong positive effect 
on their growth rates. This means that peace would put India and especially 
Pakistan on higher growth paths on a sustainable basis.  
In order to further check the conclusions drawn from our VECM results in 
table 2, we generated 6 different forecast schedules from 6 co-integrating 
VECMs as a simulation exercise to predict how conflict would be affected by 
changes in its determinants. Note that the data on Fatal are only up to 2002. 
Thus the one year forecasts are generated for Fatal for 2003 period.  Figure 6 
shows the forecast graphs. Graph 1a, 1b and 1c suggest that if military 
expenditures in both countries would remain at its current high levels, along 
with trade with the outside world at their 2002 levels, a slight deterioration in 
democracy scores will have a significant effect on the rise in hostility.  
However, if India is able to export or import more, this would at least put a 
check on any rise in the severity of conflict and hostilities would adjust to 
some average level. Any decline in Indian trade will enhance hostilities. The 
current low levels of bilateral trade between Pakistan and India is conflict 
enhancing, so more trade with increased exports by both sides to each other 
should be encouraged. More access to Pakistani markets on the Indian side 
may not lead to conflict mitigation if Pakistan is not able to also export more to  
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India. A rise in education expenditure puts a check on hostilities, as seen in 
Graph 1e. Graph 1f is the standard representation of India-Pakistan conflict, 
and not only best fits historical trends but also explain the rationale behind 
recent India-Pakistan peace initiatives with decreasing hostilities when not 
only India but Pakistan also has had economic growth rates as high as 7% 
per annum. The forecasts suggest that conflict will rise, even if there is a 
significant increase in combined democracy scores, if growth rates plummet. 
Both Pakistan and India have seen many such years, when hostilities 
between both countries rose significantly when at least one of the countries is 
performing poorly, but were channeling more resources on the military as a 
proportion of their GDPs. The forecasts favour the liberal peace over the 
democratic peace. Thus one may look at current peace talks between both 
countries with optimism as both are performing well on the economic front and 
channeling fewer resources on the military as a proportion of national income, 
while at the same time having a divergent set of political institutions, though 
recently Pakistan has edged towards greater democracy with elections in 
February 2008.  
Table 2. VECM Regression Results for Fatal: 
           VECM Regression Equations for Fatal under multiple specifications of Trade, Education and Growth  
Variables 
 
VECM 1 
 
VECM 2 
 
 
VECM 3 
 
VECM 4 
 
VECM 5 
 
VECM 6 
 
α   β  α  β  α  β  α  β  α  β  α  β  
Fatal 
-0.92* 1 -0.80* 1 -0.87* 1 -0.96* 1 0.70* 1 0.05 1 
Popen 0.27 0.15*           
Iopen 0.39* -0.38*           
Pexpg 
  0.28*** 0.15         
Iexpg 
  0.11** -0.36***         
Pimpg 
    -0.02 0.30*       
Iimpg 
    0.29* -0.85*       
Pxi 
      4.51 -0.007     
Ixp 
      2.20 -0.015*     
Pedu 
        -0.02 2.27*   
Iedu 
        -0.002 -1.53*   
Pgpc 
          -0.11** 2.18* 
Igpc 
          -0.37* 2.57* 
Pdg 
-0.027 0.034 -0.081 0.52* 0.031 -0.25 0.048 -0.024 -0.082 0.84* 0.02 2.62* 
Idg 0.009 -0.866* -0.017 -0.32 0.030 -1.35* 0.002 -0.031 -0.006 -0.84** 0.002 -2.04 
 
Demopi 17.83* 
 
0.003**
* 
17.8* 0.004** 14.73** -0.002 14.76** -0.0004 19.11 -0.008* 2.42* 
 
0.017**
* 
(MaximumVEC Rank)º (1) º (1) º (1) º (1) º (1)º (4) º 
N 53 53 53 45 53 52 
R2 0.53 0.57 0.48 0.52 0.42 0.04 
VEC(p) VEC(1) VEC(1) VEC(1) VEC(1) VEC(1) VEC(1) 
--*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, ∆ denotes values first difference,α  captures adjustment coefficients for a co-integration 
equation and β  are parameters for each variable in a co-integration equation. VEC Rank shows the maximum number of co-integration equations 
for  each VECM model significant at 5%. - VEC(p) reports lag-order for each VECM model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC), 
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 Forecasting Simulations based on VECMs for Fatal 
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4. Conclusions 
Conflict between India and Pakistan, which spans over most of last 60 years 
since their independence from British rule, has significantly hampered bilateral 
trade between the two nations. However, we also find that the converse is also 
true; more trade between India and Pakistan decreases conflict and any 
measures to improve the bilateral trade share is a considerable confidence 
building measure. A regional trade agreement along the lines of a South Asian 
Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) has a high potential for the improvement of 
relations between India and Pakistan on a long-term basis. Pakistan and India’s 
general degree of openness to world (and not bilateral) trade is, however, the 
dominant economic factor in conflict resolution. It would be interesting to see 
whether India and Pakistan will be able sustain their recent impressive growth, 
and consequently continue with peace talks confirming the liberal peace 
arguments.  
In an ideal world increased dyadic democracy between pairs of nation should 
reduce inter-state hostility according to the democratic peace hypothesis; this 
relationship in our case is present but weak. Peace initiatives, it should be 
remembered, are not the sole prerogative of democracies; they can also be 
made by countries which are less than perfectly democratic out of economic self-
interest. Pakistan, at present, is making unilateral concessions on many disputed 
issues with India. Our findings, however, veer towards the liberal peace 
hypothesis. Economic progress and poverty reduction combined with greater 
openness to international trade in general are more significant drivers of peace 
between nations like India and Pakistan, rather than the independent contribution 
of a common democratic polity. So it is more economic interdependence rather 
than politics which is likely to contribute towards peaceful relations between India 
and Pakistan in the near future. In many ways, our results for an individual dyad 
echo Polcahek’s (1997) work across several dyads, where it is argued that 
democracies cooperate not because they have common political systems, but 
because their economies are intricately and intensively interdependent. As 
pointed by Hegre (2000), it is at these higher stages of economic development 
that the contribution of common democratic values to peace becomes more 
salient. Meaningful democracy cannot truly function where poverty is acute and 
endemic, even in ostensible democracies such as India. In the final analysis, it 
may be that democracy itself is an endogenous by-product of increased general 
prosperity, as suggested nearly half a century ago by Lipset (1960). Then and 
only then, will nations be able to fully appreciate Angell-Lanes’ (1910) arguments 
regarding the futility of inter-state conflict.   
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APPENDIX: DATA and SOURCES 
 
Demopi: Pakistan and India’s combine democracy score (by adding 10 to India 
and Pakistan’s Polity2 values for each year and then taking the product of  these 
values in order to covert the variable in dyadic form), Years; 1950-2003 
 
Fatal: Annual fatality level of conflict between Pakistan and India, scores from 0 
to 6 
0 None 
1 1-25 Deaths 
2 26-100 Deaths 
3 101-250 Deaths 
4 251-500 Deaths 
5 501-999 Deaths 
6>999 Deaths 
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al 
(2004) 
 
Idg: India’s Defence Expenditure as a percentage India’s GDP at current market 
prices, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set version 3.02, 
World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government Finance 
Statistics Year Book 2006 (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan  
 
Iedug: India’s education expenditure as a %age of India’s GDP at current market 
prices, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Indian Economic Survey, Education 
Statistics (Department of Education, India) and Education Statistics 2006 (World 
Bank) 
 
Iexpg: India’s total exports as a percentage of India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, 
Source: Indian Economic Survey, International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 
Ig: Annual growth rate of India’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at 
constant prices, Years: 1950-2005, Source: Indian Economic Survey  
 
Igpc: India’s real per capita growth rate: Years: 1950-2005, Source: Indian 
Economic Survey, International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF), World 
Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank) 
 
Iimpg: India’s total imports as a percentage of India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, 
Source: Indian Economic Survey, International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 
Imilopop: India’s number of military personnel as a percentage of Indi’s total 
population. Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, 
Faten et al (2004), International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
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Iopen: India’s exports plus imports as a %age India’s GDP at current market 
prices, Years: 1950-2005, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 
Ixp: Indian exports to Pakistan, Years: 1960-2005, Source: as above. 
 
P2i: Polity 2 Score for India, numeric range from -10 (high autocracy) to 10 (high 
democracy), Years: 1950-2003, Source: Polity IV Project (Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management) 
 
P2p: Polity 2 Score for Pakistan, numeric range from -10 (high autocracy) to 10 
(high democracy), Years: 1950-2003, Source: as above. 
 
Pedug: Pakistan’s education expenditure as a percentage of Pakistan’s GDP at 
current market prices, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey 
and Education Statistics 2006 (World Bank) 
 
Pexpg: Pakistan’s exports as a percentage of Pakistan’s GDP, Years: 1950-
2005, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 
 Pdg: Pakistan’s Defence Expenditure as a percentage Pakistan’s GDP at 
current market prices, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set 
version 3.02, World Development Indicators (2006), Government Finance 
Statistics Year Book 2006 (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan  
 
Pg: Annual growth rate of Pakistan’s GDP per capita at constant prices, Years: 
1950-2005, Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 
 
Pgpc: Pakistan’s real GDP per capita Growth rates, Years: 1950-2005, Source: 
International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF), Pakistan Economic Survey 
 
Pimpg: Pakistan’s imports as a percentage of Pakistan’s GDP, Years: 1950-
2005, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 
Pmilpop: Pakistan’s number of military personnel as a percentage of Pakistan’s 
total population. Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 
3.02, Faten et al (2004), International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
  
Popen: Pakistan’s exports plus imports as a percentage Pakistan’s gross 
domestic product at current prices, Years: 1950-2005, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 
Pxi: Pakistan’s exports to India, Years: 1960-2005, Source: Direction of Trade 
Statistics yearbook, IMF 
 
